Abstract We formalize the Type 1.x Generalized Feistel Structure (GFS) in order to fill the gap between Type 1 and Type 2 GFSs. This is a natural extension of Type 1 and Type 2 GFSs, and covers them as special cases. The diffusion property of GFS is known to vary depending on the permutation used in the round function. When we have two non-linear functions in one round, we propose a permutation that has a good diffusion property, and compare it with the structure that uses a sub-block-wise cyclic shift. We also present experimental results of exhaustively evaluating the diffusion properties of all permutations up to eight sub-blocks.
Introduction
Background. The Generalized Feistel Structure, which we write GFS, is one of the structures used in the design of blockciphers and hash functions. In the classical Feistel structure, the plaintext is divided into two sub-blocks, and these are encrypted through several round functions, while in GFS, the plaintext is divided into d (≥ 3) sub-blocks. Compared to the SP network used in AES [4] , GFS has an advantage in that computation of the nonlinear functions is the same in encryption and decryption. On the other hand, the diffusion property of GFS is generally poor and it requires many rounds to be secure.
There are several types of GFSs [12, 5] . For example, Type 1, Type 2, Type 3, Source-Heavy, Target-Heavy, Alternating, and Nyberg's GFSs are known. We will focus on Type 1 and Type 2 GFSs, and the former is used for example in CAST-256 and Lesamnta, and the latter is used in RC6, HIGHT, and CLEFIA.
The security of these structures has been extensively evaluated. [5] shows the security of Nyberg's GFS. The lower bounds on the number of active S-boxes for Type 1 and Type 2 GFSs with single SP-functions and single-round diffusion are shown in [10] and [6] , respectively. [7] derives the lower bounds in the case of using multiple-round diffusions, and [1, 3, 2] analyze the security of Type 1 and Type 2 GFSs with double SP-functions.
In the round function, GFS generally uses the sub-block-wise cyclic shift over the sub-blocks, which we write πs, as the permutation. As stated above, the diffusion of GFS is generally slow and it requires many rounds to be secure. At FSE 2010, Suzaki and Minematsu proposed to use a non-cyclic shift in Type 2 GFS, and demonstrated that the diffusion property is improved by changing the permutation from πs [8] . The result is incorporated into the design of a practical blockcipher called TWINE [9] . Following [8] , Yanagihara and Iwata studied the diffusion properties of Type 1, Type 3, Source-Heavy, and Target-Heavy GFSs [11] . They showed that the diffusion properties of Type 1 and Type 3 GFSs can be improved by changing the permutation from πs.
In this paper, we abuse the definition of GFS and we use the term GFS to mean structures where their permutations are not restricted to the sub-block-wise cyclic shift. Now Type 1 GFS has one non-linear function in one round function, while Type 2 GFS has d/2 functions, where d is the number of sub-blocks which is even in Type 2 GFS. Then a natural question is to see structures where we have η non-linear functions in the round function, where
Our Contributions. In this paper, we formalize a type of GFS called Type 1.x GFS to fill the gap between Type 1 and Type 2 GFSs. Type 1.x GFS is characterized by two integers d and η, where d is the number of sub-blocks which is not necessarily even, and η is the number of the non-linear functions in one round function. Type 1.x GFS covers Type 1 and 2 GFSs as special cases; they correspond to η = 1 and η = d/2, respectively. We note that Type 1.x GFS itself is not new. For example the key schedule of 80-bit key TWINE [9] can be seen as this structure with d = 20 and η = 2.
For η = 2, we propose a construction of a permutation, which we write πp, that has a good diffusion property. We also characterize the diffusion property of Type 1.x GFS when we use πs as the permutation. We compare these two values to see that πp indeed has a better diffusion property. We also present experimental results of exhaustively evaluating the diffusion properties of all permutations for parameters 3 ≤ d ≤ 8 and 1 ≤ η ≤ ⌊d/2⌋, and confirm that the proposed construction is the optimum construction in terms of diffusion.
Preliminaries
We first introduce the Generalized Feistel Structure (GFS). Let n and d be integers, where n is the size of a sub-block in bits and d is the number of sub-blocks. Let
GFS encrypts x 0 with a secret key by applying the round function for R times iteratively, and outputs a xor operations. As shown in Fig. 1 
where [12] , Source-Heavy, Target-Heavy, and Alternating are also known as other types of GFS. We note that as we allow any permutation in Π-Layer, Nyberg's GFS can be seen as a special case of Type 2 GFS.
Type 1.x GFS
Definition of Type 1.x GFS. In this section, we formalize a type of GFS which we call Type 1.x GFS. 
where More precisely, we say that
are the same structures except that the orders of the input and the output are different.
Diffusion Property
In this section, following [8] 
d , X r for r ≥ 1 is successively defined as follows.
otherwise.
We note that a ∨ b is the or operation of a and b. Similarly, for decryption, given
otherwise. 
Definition of DRmax
(d,η) (π) [8] . Next, we define DRmax (d,η) (π), which is used to characterize the diffusion property of Type 1.x GFS using π in Π-layer. This value is defined as the minimum number of round so that every sub-block depends on all the input sub-blocks.
More precisely, it is defined as follows:
is the minimum number of round such that the i-th input sub-block diffuses to all the sub-blocks in the encryption direction. Therefore, DRmax
(π) is defined as the maximum of DRmax
Similarly, DRmax i such that some output sub-block is independent of x 0 i after any number of rounds. We also remark that the above definitions are given for the sub-block-wise dependency, and that "linear dependency" is sufficient. That is, the definition of FD does not mean that every output bit depends on all the input bits.
There are d! permutations over {0, 1, . . . , d − 1} in total, and we say that the permutation π is optimum in terms of diffusion if DRmax (d,η) (π) is the minimum among all the d! permutations. We note that the optimum π may not be unique.
We also note that this paper focuses on the diffusion property of a construction and we use DRmax (d,η) (π) to characterize the diffusion property. We expect that a better diffusion property implies better resistance against various cryptographic attacks, e.g., [8] shows, under a certain condition on the permutation, the relation between DRmax (d,d/2) (π) and the number of rounds of the impossible differential path and saturation path. However, DRmax (d,η) (π) may or may not directly reflect the security against, for example, differential or linear attacks, and hence the security against these attacks has to be evaluated independently.
Proposed Construction πp
In this section, we focus on η = 2 and present our proposed construction which we call πp. We also derive a value of DRmax (d,2) (πp). First, we present our construction of πp. We next introduce r ij and SB ij which are used to compute DRmax (d,2) (πp).
Definition 3
For any π, let r ij be the smallest integer r ≥ 1 such that π r (i) = j, and a set SB ij be
Intuitively, r ij is the smallest number of applications of π so that the i-th subblock propagates to the j-th sub-block, and SB ij is the set of sub-blocks which are passed in the process. Figure 6 shows the propagation of the left four sub-blocks of Type 1.x GFS with η = 2 and πp. The 0th sub-block propagates to the 1st sub-block, and the 3rd sub-block propagates to the 2nd sub-block in one round. The 1st sub-block propagates to the 3rd sub-block in a rounds, and the 3rd sub-block propagates to the 2nd sub-block in (d − 2 − a) rounds. By using the notation of r ij and SB ij , we have
since SB 13 = {3, 4, 5, . . . , a + 1, a + 2} and SB 20 = {0, a + 3, a + 4, . . . , d − 1}. Intuitively, πp is designed so that if the 2nd sub-block of E (d,2) (πp) is active in the encryption direction, then all the subsequent 2nd sub-blocks remain active as well. Similarly, if the 1st sub-block is active in the decryption direction, then all the 1st sub-blocks in the following rounds are active. The right (d − 2η) sub-blocks are used as the propagation from the 1st and 2nd sub-blocks to the 3rd and 0th sub-blocks, respectively.
The next lemma shows the value of DRmax (d,2) (πp).
For the lack of space, we only show a brief overview of the proof. First, we compare DRmax = (1, 3, 0, 2) . Then we have r 01 = r 32 = r 13 = r 20 = 1. Since SB 13 = {3} and SB 20 = {0}, we also have 0, 2 ̸ ∈ SB 13 , 1 ̸ ∈ SB 20 , SB 13 ∩ SB 20 = ∅, and SB 13 ∪ SB 20 ∪ {1, 2} = {0, 1, 2, 3}. Since these properties are equivalent to (1) and the proof of Lemma 1 works with these properties, we have DRmax (4, 2) (πp) = 2 × 4 − 4 = 4.
Analysis of E (d,η) (πs)
In this section, we analyze the diffusion property of E (d,η) (πs).
Lemma 2 For any
We show a brief overview of the proof. First, we compare DRmax Discussions. We summarize the comparison between Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 for 3 ≤ d ≤ 16 in Fig. 7 . From the figure, we see that
. We note that we have experimentally verified the result.
Experimental Results
In this section, we present our experimental results on computing DRmax (d,η) (π). We compute DRmax we list πs and all optimum π's, i.e., DRmax (d,η) (π) is the minimum among all permutations for given d and η. Only the lexicographically first permutations in the equivalent classes are presented in the tables. Table 1 shows the results for η = 1. Similarly, Tables 2, 3, and 4 show results for η = 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
In the tables, permutations with s are equivalent to πs. In Table 2 (for η = 2), the superscript in permutations with p indicates a value of a in Definition 2. Table 1 corresponds to Type 1 GFS, and we see that the result is the same as the result in [11] . Also, we can verify that when d = 6, the permutation π = (1, 2, 5, 0, 3, 4) in Table 3 Table 4 
Conclusions
In this paper, we formalized Type 1.x GFS, which covers Type 1 and Type 2 GFSs as special cases. We also proposed a construction πp for η = 2 and derived DRmax (d,2) (πp). We then derived DRmax (d,η) (πs), and we showed that Type 1.x GFS with πp is better than the one with πs in terms of diffusion. Finally, we presented our experimental results for 3 ≤ d ≤ 8 and 1 ≤ η ≤ ⌊d/2⌋.
As future work, it would be interesting to see constructions for η > 2 with a good diffusion property. Also, we have focused on the diffusion property and hence the structures obtained from Tables 1-4 do not imply that they can be used in practice with the suggested number of rounds. The security against various cryptographic attacks remains to be evaluated.
